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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

OSCAR PETERSEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.-

No. 7868

CLAUDE ALKEMA and niRS.
qLAUDE ALKEMA, his wife,
Defendants and Resp'Ondents.

BRIEF OF: APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the order of the Honorable
Charles G. Cowley, one of the judges of the District
Court of Weber County, State of Utah, granting the defendants' motion to dismiss the first and second counts
of plaintiff's complaint, and also granting the defendants
a summary judgment against plaintiff as to both first
and second counts in said action. The court did not prepare and file findings of fact or conclusions of law, the
court having based its decision upon the pleadings, the
depositions, and exhibits, and the arguments of counsel.
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On September 8, 1951, the plaintiff filed the following
complaint against the defendants:
(Title of Court and Cause)
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

I.
"The defendants are residents of Weber
County, State of Utah, and for all times herein
mentioned were the owners and operators of a
fruit farm at Pleasant View in Weber County,
Utah.

II.
"On or about the 24th day of July, 1951, plaintiff was employed and working for the defendants on their fruit farm at Pleasant View, Weber
County, Utah, and at said time and place it became
and was plaintiff's duty under his employment
to pick fruit from various and sundry trees located on said farm, which work necessitated the
use of a three-legged ladder about ten feet in
length furnished plaintiff by defendants for such
use; that while plaintiff. was stationed near the
top of said ladder picking apricots, the sidings of
said ladder broke in three places, causing the
ladder to collapse and fall, and plaintiff to fall
to the ground and to suffer the~ serious personal
injuries, damage and loss herein complained of.

III.
"The defendants were negligent, reckless,
careless and heedless in the following particulars,
to-wit:
a. The defendants failed, neglected and refused to furnish plaintiff safe tools and equipment
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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'vith \vhich to do the work normally, reasonably
and necessarily required of him as an apricotpicker, in that defendants furnished plain tiff a
dangerous, unsafe, \Yeak and insufficient ladder.
b. The defendants furnished plaintiff a
dangerous, unsafe and insufficient ladder for his
use in _picking apricots in this: That the sidings
of said ladder were weak, defective and insecure
and \vould not bear the weight of a normal and
ordinary man.
c. The defendants, during all the times mentioned herein, had the exclusive custody, control
and management of their farm, and all the equipment the-reon, including the ladder which broke
and collapsed under plaintiff, and they are possessed of superior, if not exclusive, access to information concerning the. precise cause of the
sudden, unusual and unexpected breaking and collapsing of the ladder, which plaintiff was using
and which caused the injuries, lo:ss and damage
to him as herein alleged, and the unusual, sudden
and unexpected breaking and collapsing of said
ladder was an event of such nature as would not
have occurred in the ordinary course of events
had the defendants exercised ordinary and reasonable care; and had the defendants exercised due
and proper care in the use, management and control of their farm and the various implements,
including the ladder situate thereon, the accident
and occurrence herein described would not have
happened, and the plaintiff would not have received the injuries, loss and damage herein complained of.

IV.
"The aforesaid acts of ne.gligence and carelessness on the part of defendants, combined and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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concurring, were and are the direct and proximate cause of the injuries sustained by plaintiff
as heT·ein set forth.

v.
"As the direct and proximate result of the
negligent, careless and heedless conduct of the
defendants, plaintiff was caused to and did sustain the following grievous personal injuries, towit: A Colles fracture of the right wrist with the
articulating surface of the. radius at right angles
to the long axis of the shaft and with a small
amount of impaction of the fragments of the
radius.

VI.
"As a result of the aforementioned injuries,
plaintiff has suffered continuously 'Since the 24th
day of July, 1951, from pain, stiffness and soreness in his right arm, and plaintiff has suffered
severe shock to his nervous system and injury and
impairment of his general health, and has suffered
great mental and physical pain ever since said
accident occurred, and plaintiff be~lieves, and
therefore says, that he will never again be fully
recovered from the injury to his right arm and
general health as herein set forth; all to hi'S damage in the sum of $12,500.00.

VII.
"The plaintiff, on account of said injuries, has
been obliged to incur medical expense, and will
be obliged to continue to do so to the extent of at
least $350.00."
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SECOND C.A.lTSE OF ACTION

I.
''Plaintiff reiterates and incorporates Paragraphs 1 to 5 inclusive of his first cause of action.

II.
.. At the time of said injury to plain tiff as

above set forth, the plaintiff was in a helpless condition and unattended by any person whose duty
it 'Yas to care for him other than the defendants
herein, and not,vithstanding that the defendants
and both of them knew of the helpless condition
of plaintiff and of his injuries heretofore set out.
and that plaintiff would probably suffer greatly
increased bodily harm unless medical aid was
immediately provided, the defendants and each of
them failed and neglected to furnish this plaintiff
any first aid or help whatsoever, but, on the contrary, loaded him into a truck and drove approximately eight miles to Ogden, Utah, to-wit, some
spot on Twenty Fifth Street in said city, and let
plaintiff out of the truck, and they did not obtain
for him first aid or medical aid or advise the. plaintiff where to obtain such aid, but merely stated
to plaintiff that they hoped he felt better in the
morning. That the plaintiff did not receive medical aid until the following day, to-wit, July 25~
1951, when he was taken to the Dee Hospital in
Ogden, Utah, after collapsing on the street.

III.
"The failure of the defendants to furnish
plaintiff with first aid or medical aid caused plaintiff great and unusual suffering, and caused plaintiff's injuries to his wrist to become aggravated,
and caused his condition of shock and nervousnes~
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to become more pronounced and lessened plain
tiff's chance of complete reco~ery; all to plaintiff'~
damage in the sum of $7 ,500.00.
"WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgmen1
against the defendants and each of them as follows:
1.
On his first cause of action, for the sum of
$12,500.00 general damages, and for reasonable
rnedical and hospital expense incurred in the sum
of $350.00.
2.
On hi'S second cause of action, for the sum of
$7,500.00 damages.
3.
F·or his costs herein expended, and such
other and further relief as the court may deem
meet and equitable in the premises." (R. 1-4)
The defendants filed their amended answer on
ruary 25, 1952, as follows:

Fe~b

(Title of Court and Cause)
"Come now the defendants in the above entitled action and for a1nended an'Swer to plaintiff's complaint herein, admit, deny and allege as
follows:
"As to plaintiff's First Cause of Action:
1. Admit Paragraph 1.
2. Answering Paragraph 2, admit that on
the 24th day of July, 1951, the plaintiff was employed by the defendants in picking apricots upon
the farm of the defendants at Pleasant View· in
Weber County, Utah. Deny each and every other
allegation set forth in Paragraph 2.
3. Deny all of Paragraph 3.
4. Deny Paragraph'S 4, 5, 6 and 7.
5. Deny each and every other allegation
set forth in plaintiff's First Cause of Action not
herein specifically admitted.
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•• . A. s to plaintiff's Second Cause of Action:
1. Deny each and every allegation set forth
in Paragraph 1 of plaintiff's First Cause of Action
as reiterated and incorporated in Paragraph 1,
except defendants admit they are residents of
\·Veber County, lTtah and that they were owners
and operators of a fruit farn1 in Pleasant View,
in 'Veber County, Utah and that on the 24th day
of July, 1951, plaintiff was employed by the defendants in picking of apricots on said farm.
2. Deny Paragraphs 2 and 3.
3. Deny each and every other allegation set
forth in plaintiff's Second Cause of Action not
herein specifically admitted.
"AS A FURTHER DEFENSE THERETO,
the defendants allege:

FIRST DEFENSE
"That the First Cause of Action of plaintiff's
complaint fails to state a claim against said defendants, or either of them upon which relief can
be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
"That the second cause of action of plaintiff's
complaint fails to state a claim against said defendants, or either of them, upon which relief can
be granted.
THIRD DEF'ENS.E
"That if the plaintiff suffered any injuries
while engaged in the employment of the defend~
ants, that such injuries, if any, so suffered, were
caused solely by the carelessness and negligence
of the plaintiff and not cause.d by the carelessness
and negligence of these defendants.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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F·OURTH DEFENSE
"That the plaintiff, at the time of the alleged
accident, did not exercise ordinary care and caution or prudence in the premises, and that the
resulting damages and injuries, if any, complained
of were directly and proximately contributed to
and caused by the fault, carelessness and negligence of the said plaintiff in the· premises.

FIFTH DEFEN'SE
"That plaintiff was, at the time of the accident, a mature man, familiar with the use of said
ladder and of sufficient capacity and intelligence
to appreciate danger; that said ladder, used by
plaintiff, was then and there an ordinary tool,
simple in construction, so that defects, if any,
therein could be discovered without skill or knowledge and without intricate inspection; that the defects, if any, in said ladder could have been discovered by plaintiff, who was then and there in
possession thereof and was and had be.en using
the same, without special skill or knowledge on the
part of plaintiff and without intricate. inspection
by him; that plaintiff was as well qualified as defendants to detect defects, if any, in said ladder
and to judge of the probable ¢!anger of using the
same.

SIXTH DEFENSE
"That plaintiff, at time of the accident, was a
mature man, familiar with the use of said ladder
and of sufficient capacity and intelligence to appreciate danger and said ladder was then and
there a simple and ordinary tool, the naturH of
which is easily understood; that plaintiff had used
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said ladder and 'vas familiar with it and assumed
the risk of defects therein, if any there we-re.
"WHEREFOR.E, defendants pray that the
plaintiff take nothing by his complaint and that
it be disn1issed, and that the defendants be
a'varded their costs." (R. 5-7)
That thereafter the case came on for pre-trial and the
court took the matter under advisement, and on May 9,
1952, made its memorandum decision as follows:
(Title of Court and Cause)
''This action having come on for pre-trial,
and being taken under advisement, comes now
the Court and grants Defendant's motion to dismiss and a summary judgment entered in favor of
said defendants under rule 56 (b) see also "F"
under said Rule.
"Costs to Defendants.
"This decision- is based on the pleadings and
depositions.
"Exhibit and Exhibit sheet filed." (R. 9)
And on May 15, 1952, the court ente.red the following
summary judgment:
(Title of Court and Cause·)
"The above-entitled cause came on regularly
for pre-trial and hearing upon defendants' motion
to dismiss on the 14th day of April, 1952, and for
further argument as to law on pre-trial and defendants' motion to dismiss on the 5th day of May,
1952, in Department No. 2 of said Court, Honorable Charles G. Cowley, presiding, plaintiff appearing by his Attorney, Ray S. McCarty, Esquire,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and defendants appearing by their Attorneys,
Samuel C. Powell, Esquire, and Derrah B. Van
Dyke, Esquire, and it having been stipulated in
open Court by counsel for plaintiff and defendants
that the deposition of the plaintiff and the deposition of the defendant, Claude Alkema, heretofore
taken, be ordered published and read and considered by the Court, and the same being thereupon published and filed, and documentary evidence and exhibits having been received in evidence, and the Court having taken the matter
under advisement, read the pleadings herein and
read and considered said depositions herein, and
having heard arguments of counsel for plaintiff
and counsel for defendants, and being advised in
the premises, and having determined that defendants' motion to dismiss should be granted and to
order that a summary judgment be entered herein
in favor of defendants and against plaintiff pursuant to Rule 56(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
"NOW, THEREFORE, on the pleadings and
depositions herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendants'
motion to dismiss be and the same is hereby
granted.
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED on said pleadings and depositions, that defendants have and recover and
they are hereby given summary judgment against
plaintiff and said action, both first and second
causes thereof, be and the same is hereby dismissed.
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED tha;t defendants have and
recoveT their costs expended herein.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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~~Dated

this 13th day of l\[ay, .r\. D.

1~)5~."

(R. 10-11)
That thereafter, and "~ithin the time required by
la,Y, the plaintiff appealed to the Supre1ne Court of the
State of lTtah fron1 the court's order granting defendants'
motion to dis1niss and granting them a sumn1ary judgment against the plaintiff.
ST.A.TEj\fENT OF· FACTS
The court's decision and judgment was based upon
the pleadings and the depositions, so it becomes necessary
to determine just what facts were admitted by the pleadings and what facts were developed by the depositions of
the plaintiff, Oscar Petersen, and the defendant, Claude
Alkema. \Ve will refer to the page of Claude Alkema's
deposition as AD ________ , and Oscar Petersen's deposition
as PD --------·
The defendants owned and operated a fruit farm of
approximately 30 acres at Pleasant View, near Ogden,
Weber County, Utah, and they acquired this prope-rty in
about the year 1935 or 1936, and this farm was planted
in peaches, apricots, cherries and a few prunes (AD 1-3).
The defendants furnished the ladders for th·e fruit
pickers. They were· regular 3-legged ladders made of
wood with seven steps. They came to a point. Five of
them were acquired in 1951 from Olson's. They were new.
The ladder which is involved in this case, and which
appears in plaintiff's Exhibits A and B attached to the
Alkema deposition, was purchased around 1945 or 1946
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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from North Ogden F·ruit Exchange. The ladders were
stored in a steel shed at the· orchard (AD 6).
On the 24th of July, 1951, the defendants had nine
8-foot · ladders. The . defendant, Claude· Alkema, who
weighs 240 pounds, claimed he was on this ladder the day
before and that it had a leather strap on the· third back
leg (AD 6). There is no dispute that on the early morning of July 24, 1951, the defendant, Claude .Alkema, picked
up five men from the employment service on 26th and
Washington Streets in Ogden for the purpose of picking
apricots (PD 8 and .AD 3). At that time plaintiff Petersen asked defendant Claude Alkema how much they were
paying and when they were paid, and Alkema replied
30c a bushel and they were paid every night. The five
of them got in the light pickup truck and the defendant,
Claude Alkema, took them out to the farm (PD 8 and .AD
3).
On July 24, 1951, the plaintiff was over 58 years of
age, and weighed 155 pounds, a single man, and had
followed mining and construction work for years. He
had worked for Morrison-ICnudsen for between 10 and
15 years (PD 1-4). For several years he would pick fruit
when there was no other work to do. In the summer of
1951 he had been picking fruit in Davis and Weber Counties (PD 4-6). For five or six years he had picked fruit
in this manner, using regular picking ladders (PD 8).
Defendant Claude Alkema stated that he arrived at
the farm with the five men approximately 6 :45 a.m. That
he told them to go down and take a row of trees and start
picking.
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"* * • I

said, ~There's ladders there·. Find you
a ladder and go to work.'" (.A. D 8).
Plaintiff Petersen said that w'hen he arrived at the farm,
the defendant, Claude . AJke1na, told each man to take a
ladder and a bucket, and that he did so (PD 8). A ladder
'vas standing by practically every tree that had not been
finished. There 'vas a ladder in the row that was assigned
to him and that was the ladder he picked (PD 21-22).
The plaintiff, on being questioned whether he examined the ladder stated:
"_.._-\.. Well, I just sat it down and shook it to
be sure it was tight and wouldn't tip over and went
right on up and started picking.
"Q. Did you look at the ladder and see what
condition it was in~
" . .-\.. No. They are supposed to have a ladder
that's safe for us.
"Q. You never examine anything you get
on1
"A. Yes. If it happene:d to be rickety or so,
I'll take a look, both the ladders get loose.
"Q. On this particular ladder, did you put
it up to see if it was rickety~
"A. I just sat it down with the three legs
and with hands like that (illustrating) and up I
went.
"Q. Did you examine it when you sat it up
with both hands to see· if it was rickety~
"A. Yes. You do that when you set it up.
"Q. Well, you saw it wasn't rickety~
"A. Yes. It wasn't rickety." (PD 9).
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Petersen moved the ladder from tree to tree and he
would see the ladder was set properly before he would
go up on it. He did not observe any cracks in the ladder,
nor did he look for them (PD 10). When he got to the
trees he had to get almost to the last step. He knew it
was way up high (PD 10). On this day the men were
stripping the trees, and according to the defendant,
Claude Alkema, the plaintiff complained of the scarcity
of the apricots (AD 8-9).
Defendant Claude Alkema told the men to quit about
2:30 p.m. (AD 10). The plaintiff was on the ladder when
nfr. Alkema told him to quit after he filled his basket.
\Vhile plaintiff was on the last step of the ladder it broke
and plaintiff was thrown to the ground (PD 11).
Exhibits A and B are· pictures of the ladder and
show the breaks in the stiles of the ladder. The defendan~
Claude Alkema, examined the ladder on that day and
saw that it was broken in three places on the side rail
(AD 12). After plaintiff fell from the ladder, he, Mr.
Alkema, stated that the plaintiff came up to where Mr.
Alkema was and said, "I've quit. I fell over backwards,
and these three top steps broke out of your ladder, and
I fell over backwards and hurt my arm." (AD 11). The
plaintiff then asked for cold water to ba.the his arm.
Alkema testified that he got several cans of water and
poured on the plaintiff's arm.
Mr. Alkema testified he had graduated from a first
aid course in the spring of 1951 (AD 13), and that plaintiff had told him he was hurt and that he looked at the
wrist but it did not appear broken to him (AD 22). That
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he poured four or five cans of cold 'Yater on it; he knew
that hot parks 'vould be bette-r, but there 'vere none available. He did not furnish him medical aid nor did he
suggest that he have medical aid (AD 14-15).
~Ir. Alkema said that "Then the plaintiff came up
to hin1, he 'Yas shaking, and ~Ir. Alkema felt his wrist
but could not see any breaks in it, and said the wrist was
not swollen and that he put him and the other men in a
truck and took them into Ogden and took the plaintiff to
2-±th and Lincoln and let him out. The plaintiff testified
that the reason that the defendant Alke·ma poured cold
water on his arm is that he could not use his right arm
himself (PD 14). That when he came into town he went
to the Milner Hotel, that he bought some liniment for his
arm, and that he did not get a doctor because he had no
money (PD 14).
That the next day he went to the employment office,
and his hand was badly swollen, and the. next day a
policeman took him to the Dee Hospital (PD 16). That
Doctor Rich Johnson took care of him.
STATEMENT OF APPELLANT'S POINTS

I.
The defendants were not excepted from the requirement that they, as employers, inspect and provide their
employes with safe tools and appliances with which to
work, notwithstanding the so-called "simple tool doctrine," and, therefore, the court erred in granting defendants a summary judgment on plaintiff's first cause of
action.
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II.
The defendants had the duty to provide medical
assistance and first aid to the plaintiff, and their failure
to do so was actionable, and, therefore, the court erred
in granting a summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's second cause of action.
ARGUMENT
lN'TRODUCTORY CoMMENTS

The lower court granted defendants' motion to disBliss and ordered that a summary judgment be entered
in favor of defendants and against the plaintiff, pursuant
to Rule 56 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Findings of fact and conclusions of law were dispensed with in the lower court. Whether or not they are
necessary may be a moot question (see Rule 41, subdivision (b)), but their value in enabling the appellant to
present and pinpoint the arguments in this case could not
be over-estimated. Not having them, the writer will do
the best he can. Of course, the appellant knows the arguments presented in the lower court, and presumes that on
the first cause of action the summary judgment was
granted, to put it broadly, on the theory of the "simple
· tool doctrine"; or, putting it another way, that the court
felt that the fruit-picking ladder was an ordinary toolr
and that the plaintiff was chargeable with knowledge
equal to that of his employers, the defendants, of all
obvious or discoverable defects therein. As to the second
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cause of action, 'vhich related to the defendants' failure
to render first aid to the plaintiff, the writer does not
know exactly "~hy the court granted a summary judgment, but will assume that the court felt that the defendants were under no legal duty to render assistance or
medical aid to the plaintiff.
The deposition of the plaintiff, which was considered
in this case, "'as taken by the defendants; the deposition
of the defendant, Claude Alkema, was taken by the plaintiff. In both cases they were for the purpose of discovery. The plaintiff has other testimony, and undoubtedly the defendants have other testimony and

evidence~,

and unless as a matter of law from the undisp·uted and
agreed facts in the case the plaintiff cannot recover on
either count, then, of course, there was a case for the jury.
A summary judgment is authorized only where the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,
where it is quite clear what the truth is and that no genuine issue remains for trial. Summary judgment should
be on evidence which a jury would not be at liberty to disbelieve and which would require a directed verdict.
Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp. (1944)
321 U. S. 620, 64 S. Ct. 724, 88 L. ed. 967.
So long as there is any genuine issue of fact, a
summary judgment will not be decreed.
Bender's Federal Practice Manual, p. 333.
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POINT I.
THE DEFENDANTS WERE NOT EXCEPTED FROM
THE REQUIREMENT THAT THEY, AS EMPLOYERS, INSPECT AND PROVIDE THEIR EMPLOYES WITH SAFE
TOOLS AND APPLIANCES WITH WHICH TO WORK, NOTWITHSTANDING THE SO-CALLED "SIMPLE TOOL DOCTRINE."

The defendants owned and operated their fruit farm,
approximately 30 acres, at Pleasant View. They depended, as one could assume from the evidence, on transient
labor for fruit pickers, and for whom they furnished ladders and other paraphernalia necessary for the job. On
the day in question, July 24, 1951, the defendant, Claude
Alkema, picked up these five pickers, of whom the plaintiff was one, early in the morning, and took them to his
orchard. He paid by the bushel. He assigned each of
them a row of trees to pick. There was a ladder in each
row. There is no evidence, nor was it a fact, that the
plaintiff had ever worked for the defendants before, or
that he was familiar with any of the defendants' equipment.
These pickers each took a ladder. The plaintiff did
not stop to examine the ladder. He did not have it tested.
The defendants should have done that. This ladder was
five or six years old. The plaintiff had a right to assume
that he would be furnished a safe ladder, suitable for the
work he was to do, and the defendants must know that if
they ,permit appliances furnished employes to become
defective, their employes are likely to suffer injury, and
that is exactly what happened. In the afternoon, while
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the plaintiff \Vas on the top rungs of the ladder, the
ladder collapsed and he \vas hurled to the ground and his
'vrist broken.
The simple tool doctrine is well-defined in the case
of Proctor v. Tozcn Clu.b, 105 U. 72, 141 P. (2) 156, wherein Justice l\lcDonough quotes from Newbern v. Great

Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 4 Cir., 68 F. 2d 523, 525, 91

A.L.R. 784:
'·'It is well settled that, while it is the duty
of the master, in exercise of reasonable care for
the safety of the employee, to see that machinery
and appliances which may cause injury to him are
in reasonably safe condition, this duty does not
ordinarily exist with respect to simple tools from
the use of which no danger is reasonably to be
apprehended or as to which the employee is in a
better position than the master to discover defects.
(Cases cited.) This is true, not because the employee assumes the risk of injury from defects
in such tools, but because the possibility of injury
is so remote as not to impose upon the master the
duty of seeing that they are free from defects in
the first instance or of inspecting them thereafter.
The fact that the employee has better opportunity
than the master to judge of the defects of such
tools, that no inspection is necessary to discover
such defects, and that no danger is to be apprehended which the employee cannot guard himself
against, renders it unnecessary in ordinary cases
that the master exercise with respect to simple
tools the care that the law requires with respect
to more complicated machinery. * * *' "
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The case of Etel v. Grubb et ux (Sup. Ct. Wash.,
June 10, 1930), 288 P. 931, held that a 10-foot step-ladder
supported by a tongue, used by a fruit picker, is not a
si1nple tool within the simple tool doctrine. In this case,
the court quoted from Pacific Telephone & Telegraph
Co. v. Starr, 206 F. 157, 162, 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1123:
" 'The workman assumes those risks of danger
which are ordinarily incident to the work in which
he is engaged, and those which are open and obvious to the senses, and which are known to him,
if he continues in the occupation. He assumes
none that may arise from latent defects in appliances not apparent from casual observation,
which appliances it is the duty of the master to
furnish, and to exercise reasonable care with reference to their selection.' "
In the instant case there were no glaring, open and
obvious defects that would put the plaintiff on notice
that he should not use the ladder. The defects were latent
and should have been discovered by the defendants, had
they properly tested and inspected the ladder.
In the case of Olson v. Kem Temple, Ancient Arabie
Order of the Mystic Shrine (S.up. Ct., North Dakota, June
17, 1950), 43 NW (2) 385, the majority opinion held that
where a member of a fraternal organization volunteered
to assist in decorating a pavilion for use of the organization and was injured in fall from a loose step of the stepladder provided for his use by the organization which had
no knowledge of such defect, the organization was not
liable, since the stepladder was a simple tool or appliance
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'vhich the parties had equal opportunity and ability to
inspect.
The dissenting opinion in this case, by Justice Christianson, seen1s to haYe grasped the real philosophy of the
simple tool doctrine. This case quoted from Corpus Juris
·secundum, on page 393 of the dissenting opinion:
'Broadly stated, it is the (positive) duty of
a master to furnish his servant with suitable and
safe instrumentalities wherewith, and places
wherein, to do his work.' 56 C.J.S., Master and
Servant, Sec. 201, p. 900.
" 'It is actionable negligence on the part of a
master to fail to furnish, or to fail to exe-rcise
ordinary or reasonable care to furnish, his servant
with such proper tools and appliances as may be
required for the reasonably safe prosecution of
the work.' 56 C.J.S., Master and Servant, Sec.
205, p. 912."
h

Justice Christianson then goes on and gives the sumlnarization by Labatt in his work on Master and Servant:
(p. 394) "'It is submitted that, as has been indicated above, it is illogical and unreasonable to say
that the master is free from the obligation of using
ordinary care merely because the appliance to be
furnished is a simple tool, but the better view is
that the appliance being a simple tool, and entirely
understood by the servant, the latter's obligations
to ·his master and to himself are increased; and
cases involving injuries from simple tools furnish
a broader scope for the application of the various
affirmative defenses which are ordinarily availSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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able to the master.' 3 Labatt's Master and Servant,
2d Ed., Sec. 924a, pp. 2476-2484."
Both parties in the lower court depended a great deal
upon our own Utah case of Proctor v. Town Club, supra.
Justice McDonough ably discussed the simple tool doctrine and assembled the various cases and annotations
dealing with that question. He quoted from Labatt on
Master and Servant, supra, as quoted by Justice Frick
in Russell v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 53 U. 457,174
P. 663, on page 159 of the Pacific citation of the Proctor
case. Continuing with the Proctor case on page 159,
Justice McDonough said:
"Nevertheless, we may assume for the purposes of this case, without so deciding, that as to a
simple as well as to a more complex tool or instrumentality, a master who furnishes to his workmen regularly employed, such tool as an incident
of his regular business, has the duty of prudently
inspecting it or be liable for injuries resulting
from defects which inspection would have revealed; unless the servant has ·knowledge of such
defect and is aware of and appreciates the dangers
arising from its use, or unless the defect and
danger are so open and obvious that an ordinarily
prudent person would have observed and appreciated them."
In Fisher v. M-K Express Co. (Mo. App., 1942), 158
SW {2) 458, it is stated:

"Mere knowledge of the danger of a place
to work or of the appliances on the part of the
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servant will not defeat an action for personal injuries suffered by the serYant unless the danger is
so glaring, open and obvious as to threaten inlmediate and almost certain injury or unle'Ss the
danger is so glaring, open and ~bvious that a man
of ordinary prudence would not attempt to occupy or use the place or appliances."
The case of JJ oran i'. Zenith Oil Co. (Dist. Ct. of
.A.pp., 2d Dist., Div. 2, Calif., June 7, 1949), 206 P(2) 679,
aptly states the rule as to latent defects in equipment.
The court said on page 681 :
"When the occupant of land knowingly permits a person to enter the premises for the purpose of performing acts which the workman has
been employed to do, the proprietor is obliged to
exercise reasonable care for the protection of the
toiler. He must supply a reasonably safe place in
which the work is to be done and must furnish and
maintain such tools and appliances as are· necessary and reasonably safe for use in the operations.
A laborer so employed is chargeable with neither.
a concealed nor a latent defect in the equipment
supplied. In the event he is injured as a result
of a latent defect in the instrumentalities furnished him of which he is ignorant, he may recover damages for resulting injuries, if it is.shown
that the employer, licensor or proprietor knew or
by the exercise of reasonable care should have
known of the defect and has failed to effect a
repair thereof or to warn the workman. Miller
v. Pacific Constructors, Inc., 68 Cal. App. 2d 529,
545, 157 P. 2d 57."
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Our court, as recently as this year, in the case of
Reynolds v. American Foundry & Machine Co., ------ Utah
------, 239 I) (2) 209, at page 210,. subscribed to the doctrine
set out in the Restatement of Torts, paragraph 392:
"Chattel Dangerous F'or Intended Use. One
who supplies to another, directly or through a
third person, a chattel to be used for the supplier's
business purposes is subject to liability to those
for whose use the chattel is supplied, or to those
whom he should expect to be in the vicinity of its
probable use, for bodily harm caused by the use
of the chattel in the manner for which and by persons for whose use the chattel is supplied:
" (a) * * *
"(b) if the supplier's failure to give to those
whom he should expect to use the chattel the information required by the rule stated in paragraph 388 is due to his failure to exercise reasonable care to discover its dangerous character or
condition."
In this case the defendants hauled the employes to
their farm by truck. They assigned each picker a row of
trees to strip of the fruit. At each row there was a ladder .
. That was the ladder to be used by the picker for that row.
Each of these pickers, including the plaintiff, had a right
to assume and expect that his ladder was safe and fit for
the use intended. These pickers should not be expected
on their own time to minutely inspect each ladder. That
duty rested on the defendants. The defendants knew that
ladders, like all tools in constant use, must eventually
become defective and unsafe for use. The ladder in question had been used for five or six ye-ars, and the· defendSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ants knew that its life of usefulness \vas about ended.
Therefore, they had the duty of regularly inspecting these
ladders, and if a different rrew can1e each day to pick,
each ladder should have been inspected either at the end
of each day's \York or in the morning before the work
began. lT nder the better reasoned cases definitely this
ladder \Yas not \Yhat "'"ould be considered a simple tool,
and even if it \Yere, under the circumstances as exist in
the case the defendants \Yould still not be relieved from
inspecting and providing the plaintiff with a safe ladder.
If the plaintiff had been assigned a ladder and he
used the same ladder day after day, that might change
the picture somewhat, and if, as in the Proctor v. Town
Club case, the ladder \vas not used as a part of the defendants' business but \vas merely loaned to the plaintiff
as an accommodation, the answer might be different, or
if the defects in the ladder had been so glaring and obvious that the plaintiff could not have helped but see· them
and he persisted in using the ladder and was injured, then
again he could not recover. But none of those conditions
existed in the instant case. This case came squarely under
Justice McDonough's statement in the Proctor v. Town
Club ease, supra, on page 22 of this brief.
By the authority of Proctor v. Town Club alone, the
court's order granting defendants a summary judgment
on the first cause of action should be reversed.
POINT II.
THE DEFENDANTS HAD THE DUTY TO PROVIDE
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE AND FIRST AID TO THE PLAINTIFF, AND THEIR FAILURE TO DO SO WAS ACTIONABLE.
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The plaintiff suffered grievous injuries caused by the
collapse and falling of the ladder furnished by the defendants. He was seven or eight miles from town. He
was unattended by any friend whose duty it was to take
care of him, other than the defendants. The defendants
kne·w of his helpless and pitiable condition. The defendant, Claude Alkema, had graduated from a first aid
course in the spring of 1951, yet all he did to aid this
suffering plaintiff was to pour four or five cans of cold
water on his wrist. He not only failed to furnish him
medical aid, but did not even suggest that he seek it.
The defendant, Claude Alkema, put the plaintiff and the
other men in a truck and took them to Ogden, where he
let them off on 24th and Lincoln Streets. Being fully
aware of the plaintiff's condition, he did not give him any
first aid, did not take him to a physician, or even take
him to the vicinity of a hospital. He made no effort to
put medical care and assistance during this emergency
within the reach of this injured employe.
In the case of Szabo v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (N.J.,
Jan. 4, 1945), 40 A tl. ( 2) 562, on page 563, the court
said:
"It is conceded that in this and other jurisdictions the law is, that in the absence of a contract or
a statute, there rests no duty upon an employer to
provide medical service or other means of cure to
an ill, diseased or injured employee, even though it
result from the negligence of the master, Koviacs
v. Edison Portland Cement Company, 128 A. 542,
3 N.J. Misc. 368; 39 C.J. 240, sec. 348.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

27
"In our judgment there is a sound and wise
exception to this rule, founded upon humane instincts.
··That exception is, that where one engaged
in the work of his master receives injuries,
'vhether or not due to the negligence of the mastHr,
rendering him helpless to provide for his own
care, dictates of humanity, duty and fair dealing
require that the master put in the reach of such
stricken employee such medical care and other
assistance as the emergency, thus created, may in
reason require, so that the stricken employee may
have his life saved or may avoid further bodily
harm. This duty arises out of strict necessity
and urgent exigency. It arises with the emergency
and expires with it.
"This precept probably had its inception in
the code of moral conduct, but, like many others,
such as furnishing the employee with a safe place
in which to work, and proper tools with which to
labor, has become a legal duty incorporated in
every contract of hiring, by legal inference, notwithstanding a lack of specific provision or statutory requirement. * * * (citing cases)"
See also : 56 C.J .S. 815, Sec. 162; 212 SW 345;
35 Am. Juris. 537-538, See. 109.
The defendant, Claude Alkema, could at least have
taken this man to some doctor's office or even the emergency hospital if he wished to avoid the expense or the
embarrassment of asking a doctor to give free treatment
for one of his injured employes, but in this case, he deliberately abandoned this stricken man on the streets of
Ogden, knowing that he could not take care of himself.
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The facts in this case come squarely within the above
rule, where the master is obliged to give emergency
treatment to his injured employe. As in Point I, the facts
are such that it is clearly a question for the jury to decide,
and the court definitely erred in granting defendants'
motion for a summary judgment on this second cause of
action.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the plaintiff contends that the court's
order of summary judgment was contrary to law and
unsupported by the evidence.
The court, in granting a summary judgment, was
bound to look at the evidence in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff; however, if the lower court had viewed
the evidence most favorable to the defendants, he still,
under the law as set forth in the cases, and especially
the Utah case of Proctor v. Town Club, supra, would not
have been justified in granting the summary 'judgment
on the first cause of action.
The facts in the second cause of action come squarely
within that rule of law that holds that when an employe,
while engaged in the line of his duty, is rendered helpless, the dictates of humanity, duty and fair dealing demand that the employer furnish medical assistance.
Therefore, the judgment of the lower court should be
reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

RAY S. McCARTY
Attorney for plaitntiff and
app-ellant.
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